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Expanding Horizons: Scientific Frontiers,
Legal Regulation, and Globalization
BELINDA BENNETT*
ABSTRACT
In the six decades since the discovery of the double helix structure of
DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, developments in genetic science have
transformed our understanding of human health and disease. These
developments, along with those in other areas such as computer science,
biotechnology, and nanotechnology, have opened exciting new
possibilities for the future. In addition, the increasing trend for
technologies to converge and build upon each other potentially increases
the pace of change, constantly expanding the boundaries of the scientific
frontier. At the same time, however, scientific advances are often
accompanied by public unease over the potentialfor unforeseen, negative
outcomes. For governments, these issues present significant challenges
for effective regulation. This Article analyzes the challenges associated
with crafting laws for rapidly changing science and technology. It
considers whether we need to regulate, how best to regulate for
converging technologies, and how best to ensure the continued relevance
of laws in the face of change.
INTRODUCTION
Since our earliest days, people have explored unknown territory.
Indeed, exploration is in many ways synonymous with human history.
Whether we think of the earliest days of humanity and the movement of
people within and beyond Africa,' the great ocean journeys across the

* Professor of Health and Medical Law, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney,
Australia. An earlier version of this paper was presented as the George P. Smith II lecture
at Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana, on November 10, 2011. Parts of this
paper were also presented at the Forum on Synthetic Biology: Challenges and
Opportunitiesfor Australia,in Sydney, Australia on March 13, 2012.
1. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: A SHORT HISTORY OF EVERYBODY

FOR THE LAST 13,000 YEARS 35-52 (1998).
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Pacific by Polynesians, 2 or the movement of people across land bridges
in Asia during the last ice age, 3 the new and the unknown have been
constant companions. In time, the paths of some of these journeys came
to be well-trodden trade routes with commodities such as spices, silks,
and porcelain traveling vast distances before reaching their final
destination-as was the case, for example, of the great Silk Road
between China and Europe-and technology and innovation traveling
alongside trade. 4 It is necessary, however, to qualify this story of
discovery of the unknown, for what was unknown territory to the
discoverers was already familiar to the local populations who lived
there, and at times the new arrivals brought with them death, disease,
and the destruction of traditional ways of life. 5 But this aspect of the
story does not change the fact that for those who had never been there
before, the territory was new and what one would find there on arrival
was unknown. In this modern age of television, movies, and the
Internet, it is difficult to imagine the completely unknowable nature of
regions of our world in those past times. Perhaps our closest modern
equivalent is outer space, although perhaps even space is not as
unknowable as it once was.
The language of exploration and discovery is also used to describe
modern science. We speak of scientific quests, of frontiers of knowledge,
and of discoveries. There is the same sense of charting the unknown and
the same sense of promise and risk sitting side by side. Just as the
journeys and discoveries of old brought with them profound changes for
all whose lives were touched, so too modern science brings with it the
promise, and for some, the threat, of profound change.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW
Concerns about the impact of modern science are usually focused on
new technologies. This is not to suggest that there are no concerns about
the impact of older technologies. Even well-established technologies may
lead to concerns, such as contemporary debates about pollution and
climate change. In contrast, the concerns about new technologies arise

2. See generally id. at 53-66.
3. See generally id. at 41-44.
4. See id. at 239-64.
5. See id. at 210-14. As Diamond notes, "[tihe importance of lethal microbes in human
history is well illustrated by Europeans' conquest and depopulation of the New World. Far
more Native Americans died in bed from Eurasian germs than on the battlefield from
European guns and swords." Id. at 210.

EXPANDING HORIZONS

when the technology is still new and emerging. 6 However, debates about
new technologies usually reveal particular anxieties about change and
the pace of that change. During the twentieth century we witnessed a
dramatic increase in scientific knowledge. The last 100 years have
brought us the discovery of penicillin, 7 television, 8 computers and the
Internet, 9 nanotechnology, 10 the discovery of the double helix structure
of DNA,11 the mapping of the human genome, 12 and in vitro
fertilization. 13 There are, of course, many more examples. The rate of
change in the realm of science is such that we constantly struggle to
14
keep pace with it. Of course what is new today is not new tomorrow.
For the most part, technology rapidly becomes either obsolete or
familiar. Some forms of technology, however, seem to present us with
particular challenges, for they lead us to think about what it means to
be human, what it means to manage risk, and whether law has a role in
negotiating the technological future. These are the new or emerging
technologies that are the subject of this Article.
In a recent consultation paper, the U.K. Nuffield Council on
Bioethics described "emerging technologies" as those that

6. The emerging nature of new technologies presents challenges for the identification
and management of risk. See Part II infra.
7. See The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1945, NOBEL PRIZE,
www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/medicine/laureates/1945 (last visited Apr. 17, 2012)
("The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1945 was awarded jointly to Sir Alexander
Fleming, Ernst Boris Chain and Sir Howard Walter Florey 'for the discovery of penicillin
and its curative effect in various infectious diseases.").
8. The first demonstration of television took place in 1926 in England. See Popular
Australian Television, AUSTL. GOV'T, http://australia.gov.aulabout-australia/australianstory/popular-austn-television (last updated Aug. 27, 2007). The first television broadcasts
began in the United States in 1928, in Britain in 1936, and in 1956 in Australia. See id.
9. Thomas Friedman includes both the personal computer and the development of the
Internet amongst his list of forces that "flattened the world." See generally THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2006).
10. For discussion of nanotechnologies, see generally THE ROYAL SOC'Y & THE ROYAL
ACAD. OF ENG'G, NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND
UNCERTAINTIES (2004).
11. The double helix structure of DNA was discovered by James Watson and Francis
Crick in 1953. See generally JAMES WATSON, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE (2003).
12. See generally id. See also The Human Genome, 409 NATURE 745 (2001).
13. The world's first in vitro fertilization (IVF) baby was born in England in 1978. See
Sci. AND TECH. COMm., HUMAN REPRODUCTIvE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW, 2004-5, H.C.
7-1, at 3 (U.K.).
14. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, New Technologies, the Precautionary
Principle, and Public Participation,in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161, 161
(Th~r6se Murphy ed., 2009) (stating that "a 'new technology' of today will no longer be
'new' in the future, and that, more generally, all technologies are 'new' when they are first
introduced into society").
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*

arise from new knowledge, or the innovative
application of existing knowledge;

"

lead to the
capabilities;

"

are projected to have significant systemic and
long-lasting economic, social, and political
impacts;

*

create new opportunities for and challenges to
addressing global issues; and

*

have the potential to disrupt or create entire
15
industries.

rapid

development

of

new

As a consideration of assisted reproductive technologies, genetics,
and nanotechnology reveals, emerging technologies bring scientific
advances and social and regulatory challenges.
It is now more than thirty years since the birth of the world's first in
vitro fertilization baby in England in 1978.16 In the subsequent period,
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) have helped many infertile
couples to conceive a child. So widespread is the use of ART that an
17
estimated 3.1% of children born in Australia are conceived using ART.
The familiarity with the use of ART has eased many of the concerns
that arose during the early days of the technology.' 8 Yet while we have
moved past the early fears surrounding ART of "test-tube babies" and
the scientific nature of the process, the increasing link between ART
and genetics is, as Th6r~se Murphy has pointed out, "taking us 'back to
the future' . . . [in which] burgeoning references to designer babies and

15. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGIES: CONSULTATION
PAPER 4 (2011).
16. See SCI. AND TECH. COMM., supranote 13.
17. YUEPING ALEX WANG ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE,
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY SERIES No. 13, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 2007, at ix (2009).
18. As Don Chalmers noted, "The assisted reproductive technology (ART) debate has
raised fundamental social, ethical and legal questions about the very essence of
personhood and humanness. In the early days of ART, everything seemed possible and
every ethical principle seemed vulnerable to these technologies." Don Chalmers,
Professional Self-Regulation and Guidelines in Assisted Reproduction, 9 J. OF L. & MED.
414, 414 (2002).
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parental eugenics could be said to resonate with the early labelling of
ARTs as artificialreproduction technologies."19
The discovery of the double helix structure of DNA in 1953 by
Francis Crick and James Watson heralded the start of the modern
genetic age. 20 Since then, scientists have mapped the human genome,
and a range of genetic mutations associated with disease have been
identified, providing individuals with more information about their risk
of disease. 21 Yet, the genetic age has also brought with it heightened
concerns over the potential for genetic discrimination in the context of
employment and insurance, 22 concerns over the potential for a new
eugenics in the context of reproductive decision making,23 and concerns
over the transformation of privacy rights as genetic information is
increasingly configured as familial rather than individual. 24 Genetics
has also brought modification of crops, increasing production and yields
while reducing loss due to pests and diseases. However, concern over
the impact of genetically modified organisms on the environment has
sparked public debate, and the genetic modification of foods has been
controversial, particularly in England and elsewhere in Europe, where
there has been widespread opposition to genetically modified (GM)
foods.25

19. Thdrbse Murphy, The Texture of Reproductive Choice: Law, Ethnography, and
Reproductive Technologies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 200 (Thdr~se
Murphy ed., 2009). See also Isabel Karpin & Belinda Bennett, Genetic Technologies and
the Regulation of Reproductive Decision-making in Australia, 14 J. OF L. & MED. 127
(2006) (discussing the link between ART and genetics).
20. For discussion, see generally WATSON, supranote 11.
21. For example, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations are associated with an

increased risk of breast cancer. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing,
NATL CANCER INST., www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last updated
May 29, 2009).
22. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N &
AUsTL. HEALTH ETHICS COMM., ESSENTIALLY YOURS: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
GENETIC INFORMATION IN AUSTRALIA (2003).
23. See Murphy, supra note 19; Han Somsen, Regulating Human Genetics in a NeoEugenic Era, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (Thdrbse Murphy ed., 2009).
See also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (2003).
24. See generally Dean Bell & Belinda Bennett, Genetic Secrets and the Family, 9 MED.
L. REV. 130 (2001); see also Belinda Bennett, Genetics and the Transformation of the
Personal,35 MONASH U. L. REV. 296 (2009).
25. See Stephen Tromans, Promise,Peril, Precaution:The EnvironmentalRegulation of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 187 (2001). See generally
Alan Irwin, The Global Context for Risk Governance: National Regulatory Policy in an
InternationalFramework, in GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH LAW
AND BIOETHICS 71 (Belinda Bennett & George F. Tomossy eds., 2006) (discussing the
debate over genetically modified food in England).
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Like biotechnology and biomedicine, nanotechnology may allow for
the development of new therapeutics. The Royal Society and the Royal
Academy of Engineering define nanotechnologies as "the design,
characterisation, production and application of structures, devices and
systems by controlling shape and size at nanometre scale." 26 A
nanometre is measured as one-billionth of a meter, or 10-9 m. 27 Possible
industrial applications from nanotechnology include the development of
new cutting tools using nanocrystalline materials, the use of
nanoparticles in paints to improve performance, and the use of longerlasting nanomaterials in medical implants. 28 Concerns have been
expressed, however, about the potential for nano-sized particles to pose
risks to human health and the environment. In their 2004 report on
nanotechnology, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of
Engineering stated:
Free particles in the nanometre size range do raise
health, environmental and safety concerns and their
toxicology cannot be inferred from that of particles of the
same chemical at larger size. The difference comes
largely from two size-dependent factors: the larger
surface area of small particles compared with larger
particles, given equal mass, and the probable ability of
nanoparticles to penetrate cells more easily and in a
29
different manner than larger ones.
One of the best-known concerns raised about the safety of
nanotechnology is the "grey goo" scenario in which self-replicating nanosized robots would eventually cover the planet.30 Yet in relation to grey
goo, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy report concluded "[o]ur
experience with chemistry and physics teaches us that we do not have
any idea how to make an autonomous self-replicating mechanical
31
machine at any scale, let alone nanoscale."
Over recent decades, advances in reproductive technologies,
genetics, and nanotechnologies have promised a dazzling array of
scientific advances and benefits. At the same time, scientific and
technological advances have been accompanied by concerns over the
potential for unforeseen negative outcomes. Public debate around most
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

THE ROYAL SOC'Y & THE RoYAL AcAD. OF ENG'G, supra note 10, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 10-13.
Id. at 49.
See id. at 109.
Id.
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new technologies share the common feature of being caught between the
hope and promise of major advances on the one hand, and dystopian
visions of a high-tech but bleak future on the other. The often-emotive
landscape of public debate surrounding new technologies is further
complicated by the pace of scientific change, which challenges all but
experts to keep pace with the ever-expanding scientific frontier. For
governments, the complexity of the science, the rapid pace of scientific
change, the uncertain nature of risk for developing technologies, and the
diversity of community views all present enormous challenges for
32
effective regulation.
While each new technology brings a unique set of developments,
possibilities, and challenges, increasingly too we are witnessing the
convergence of technologies as developments in one field provide a
platform for developments in another. The potential for new
technologies to converge, to build upon, and leverage off each other in
ways that support the development of a new round of technological
advances, brings with it the potential for exciting new developments in
science and technology. To date, the discussion of converging
technologies has focused on "NBIC" technologies (i.e. nanotechnology,
biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science). 33 This
convergence represents the early stages of a new period in scientific
advances. While biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information and
communication technology have been described as being "among the last
major technology initiatives of the 20th century," their convergence has
been described as "[t]he first major research initiative of the 21st
century." 34 Alfred Nordmann describes this transformation as having
wide-ranging ramifications, "[i]nfo-, bio-, and nanotechnologies
complement each other and have begun to join forces with cognitive
science, social psychology and other social sciences. This convergence
promises to transform every aspect of life."3 5

32. See BELINDA BENNETT, HEALTH LAW's KALEIDOSCOPE: HEALTH LAW RIGHTS IN A
GLOBAL AGE 5-14 (2008); see also ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 123 (2008).
33. NAT'L Sci. FOUND., CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING HUMAN
PERFORMANCE: NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND

COGNITIVE SCIENCE ix (Mihail C. Roco & William Sims Bainbridge eds., 2003). See also
Belinda Bennett, Regulating Small Things: Genes, Gametes and Nanotechnology, 15 J. OF
L. & MED. 153, 155-56 (2007).
34. Rapporteur, Converging Technologies-Shaping the Future of European Societies,
European Comm'n, 7 (2004) (by Alfred Nordmann).
35. Id.
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II. RISK AND PRECAUTION
Risk is a key feature of journeys to the frontier. It is impossible to
know in advance all that one might encounter on the journey, or the
hazards that may be faced. As George Annas reminds us, the drawers of
pre-Columbian maps often marked the boundaries of the known world
with reminders that dragons inhabited the territory beyond as a symbol
of the hazards of the unknown. 36 Sometimes on our journeys of
discovery the new territory brings with it a startling new insightsomething that is unpredictable and unforeseen that changes our
worldview. One only need to look at old maps to see this, for the
discovery of a previously unknown land mass called for the redrawing of
maps. Magellan's circumnavigation of the globe in the 1500s confirmed
that the world was spherical rather than flat and that if you kept sailing
in one direction, you would come back to your starting point rather than
sail off the edge of the world.
Scientific discoveries have also transformed our outlook with the
mapping of the human genome providing new insights into the nature of
human health and disease. Meanwhile, nanotechnologies have altered
our perceptions of scale and the properties of materials. Nikolas Rose
has argued that genetic testing changes the way we think about genetic
risk for, as he argues, "predictive genetic testing introduces a
qualitative new dimension into genetic risk, creating new categories of
individuals and according genetic risk a new calculability." 37 Yet, while
new technologies may transform our understandings of our world in
grand and sweeping ways, this challenging of one's knowledge can occur
at a much more modest level and indeed may be as simple as the
sighting of a bird.
Throughout European history, Europeans assumed that all swans
were white. 38 When Europeans arrived in Australia they discovered,
however, that some swans were black. 39 In fact, black swans are native
to Australia, and the sighting of black swans suddenly challenged all
previous assumptions about the inherent whiteness of swans. In his
2007 book, The Black Swan, Nassim Taleb uses the term "Black Swan"

36. See George J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster
Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 629 (1990).
37. NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 107 (2007).
38. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE xvii (2007).

39. Again, there is the issue of perspective here because Indigenous Australians knew
that swans were black.
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to describe events that are highly improbable. As Taleb argues, the
sighting of a black swan
illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from
observations or experience and the fragility of our
knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a
general statement
derived
from
millennia
of
40
confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans.
For Taleb, a Black Swan event has three characteristics. First, it is
outside our expectations because we are unable to predict it on the basis
of our past experience. 4 1 Secondly, a Black Swan event has "an extreme
impact." 42 Finally, although we were unable to predict it in advance, we
will, after the event, find explanations for the event that will make it
both "explainable and predictable." 43 These three characteristics, which
Taleb summarizes as "rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though
not prospective) predictability," 44 highlight the challenges we face when
we attempt to plan or predict the future. According to Black Swan
theory, "what you don't know [is] far more relevant than what you do
know."

45

A Black Swan event is not necessarily a negative event. Taleb refers
to the computer, the Internet, and the laser as three technological
developments usually identified by people as having the most impact on
our world. 46 As Taleb points out, "[a]ll three were unplanned,
unpredicted, and unappreciated upon their discovery, and remained
unappreciated well after their initial use."47 Each of these events is
described as a Black Swan according to Taleb.
The Black Swan theory has some important lessons for our
approach to new technologies and for our ability to predict and manage
risk. Our response to risk is a key element in our response to new
technologies. While the technologies outlined above offer enormous
promise, they also potentially bring with them risks that we may not be
able to foresee. As a recent report by the Presidential Commission for
the Study of Bioethical Issues commented:

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

TALEB, supranote 38 at xvii.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xvii-xviii.
Id. at xviii.
Id. at xix.
Id. at 135.
Id.
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Recent advances in biotechnology have transformed the
life sciences, yielding a level of innovation rarely
witnessed in human history. These achievements raise a
host of complex and often controversial issues.
Breakthroughs can help humankind in many ways, but
they invariably carry some risks. Discoveries of new
ways of improving or enhancing life raise public hopes
and expectations, but they also raise public concerns
48
and, often, fears.
Our concern with risk in the context of new technologies is not
surprising, for modern society has been characterized as one in which
risk is a central concern. Indeed, Ulrich Beck describes contemporary
society as "risk society." 49 While risk is a central concern, our approach
to risk often separates risk assessment, which is a technical exercise by
experts in the field, from risk management, which is essentially a
political exercise. 50 Although the importance of public engagement with
new and emerging technologies has been recognized, 51 it is important to
realize that public opinion may vary across different applications of a
technology. 52 Furthermore, one challenging part of the public
engagement process is "how to engage with the unengaged, rather than
the already engaged." 53 Recognizing these challenges, Australia's
National Enabling Technologies Strategy has "engaging with the public"
54
as one of its six themes.
A. A PrecautionaryApproach to Risk?
The Precautionary Principle is one approach to managing risk in the
face of uncertainty. It has been adopted widely in the context of

48. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS:
THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 21 (2010).

49. See generallyULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992).
50. See Maria Lee, Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation, 62
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 242, 244 (2009).

51. Id. at 245 (pointing out that we have moved beyond a view of public understanding
of science as a deficit model where the public does not understand the science).
52. See generally Craig Cormick, Why Do We Need to Know What the Public Thinks
About Nanotechnology?, 3 NANOETHICS 167 (2009).
53. Craig Cormick, Piecing Together the Elephant: Public Engagement on
Nanotechnology Challenges, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 439 (2009).
54. DEP'T OF INNOVATION, INDUS., SCI. & RES., NATIONAL ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
STRATEGY, 4 (2010), available at www.innovation.gov.au.
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environmental law and regulation. 55 The Rio Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development states the
precautionary principle in the following terms in Principle 15: "[iun
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation." 56 This cautious approach allows
measures to be taken for environmental protection even where there is
still scientific uncertainty over the threat. It has been suggested that
this principle could also have useful application in the context of risk
assessment and new technologies. 57 In many ways, the use of the
precautionary principle seems sensible. New technologies are
characterized by scientific uncertainty over the nature and extent of
associated risk, and an approach based on taking steps to prevent harm
in the face of a threat, albeit an uncertain one, would seem to strike a
workable balance.
Perhaps one of the main challenges with using the precautionary
principle as a foundation for our management of new and emerging
technologies is the absence of a shared definition of the principle.
Although the Rio Declaration is one well-known definition of the
precautionary principle, there are a number of other formulations of the
principle, with versions ranging from weak to strong. Gary E. Marchant
and Douglas J. Sylvester argue that although we refer to
"the" precautionary principle, there is no standard or
accepted version of the precautionary principle. At least
nineteen different versions of the precautionary
principle have been identified, differing in important
58
respects in several different dimensions.

55. See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV. 13 (2002), for a discussion of these issues.
56. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, Princ. 15, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
57. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 14; Fritz Allhof, Risk, Precaution and
Emerging Technologies, 3 STUD. ETHICS L. & TECH. (2009); John S. Applegate, The
Prometheus Principle: Using the PrecautionaryPrinciple to Harmonize the Regulation of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2001).
58. Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. Sylvester, TransnationalModels for Regulation of
Nanotechnology, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 714, 721 (2006).
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Both the weak and strong versions of the precautionary principle
59
have been criticized.
In addition, the utility of the precautionary principle for managing
risk has been hotly contested. Marchant and Sylvester argue, for
example, that the precautionary principle is ambiguous on key issues of
risk, such as the level of acceptable risk, the indicators necessary to
trigger precaution, the data needed- to demonstrate that it is safe to
proceed with a technology, the manner whereby costs and benefits
should be balanced, and the type of action needed in order to satisfy the
60
precautionary principle.
Cass Sunstein has also critiqued the precautionary principle,
arguing that it "threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation,
inaction, and every step in between." 61 Sunstein does not object to the
weaker versions of the precautionary principle, such as the Rio
Declaration, which suggest that we should not defer regulating simply
because of uncertainty. 62 Rather, it is the stronger versions of the
principle that Sunstein sees as problematic. Sunstein understands "the
principle in a strong way, to suggest that regulation is required
whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment,
even if the supporting evidence is speculative and even if the economic
costs of regulation are high."63 For Sunstein, under the strong version of
the principle, "the threshold burden is minimal, and once it is met, there
is something like a presumption in favor of stringent regulatory
controls." 64 Rather than solving problems of risk, Sunstein argues that
the precautionary principle "leads in no direction at all."65 As Sunstein
concludes, "[t]he reason is that risks of one kind or another are on all
sides of regulatory choices, and it is therefore impossible, in most realworld cases, to avoid running afoul of the principle." 66
59. As Russell Powell observes, weak versions have been criticized as "impotent,
vacuous, and trivial, and viewed as so narrow in scope and empty in prescriptive content
that they add little to existing theories of policymaking and adjudication," while strong
versions have been criticized as having "an irrational, parochial focus on risk-avoidance
and environmental harm, which causes them to overlook the potential benefits of
nonregulation and the importance of nonenvironmental factors." See Russell Powell,
What's the Harm? An Evolutionary Theoretical Critique of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 20
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 181, 184 (2010).
60. Marchant & Sylvester, supra note 58, at 721.
61. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1004 (2003). For a defense of the precautionary principle, see Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the
Strong PrecautionaryPrinciplefrom its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285 (2011).
62. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1012, 1016.
63. Id. at 1018. For discussion see Sachs, supra note 61, at 1312.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1054.
66. Id.
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While it is the stronger versions of the precautionary principle that
have attracted the most criticism, John Applegate argues that as the
principle has been adopted more widely, its elements have changed so
67
as to become "less stringent or to narrow the scope of the principle."
The principle's stronger versions have, according to Applegate, "been
systematically tamed-reduced, as it were, from a tiger to a housecat." 68
Others argue that it is important that the principle not be confused
"with the separate question of how precautionary regulatory policy
should be, both in the breadth of regulatory targets and the stringency
with which they are regulated." 69 Robert V. Percival contends that each
country would need to decide, through democratic processes, '"ow
precautionary regulatory policy should be"70 and urges us to "[flear not
71
the precautionary principle."
The precautionary principle does have a certain appeal as it
"provides a useful framework for managing risk in the face of scientific
uncertainty."72 Perhaps most importantly, the precautionary principle
allows us to take an incremental approach to regulatory decisions in the
face of uncertain risks. 73 Furthermore, the policy decisions involved in
determining the strength of precautionary regulation will need to be
made in the context of specific technologies, as the rationale for
invoking the principle may vary in different contexts. 74 Ultimately, the
precautionary principle will be a reminder of the importance of risk and
"to correct an imbalance between our perception of the costs of
regulatory action and our understanding and consideration of the costs
of regulatory inaction." 75 Yet, the critique of the principle highlights the
need to develop sophisticated understandings of risk, while the debate
over the utility of the principle as a guide for decision making serves as
a clear reminder of the complexity of deciding which risks to regulate
when we are dealing with new technologies and uncertain risks.

67. Applegate, supranote 55, at 15-16.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of the PrecautionaryPrinciple?,23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 21, 22 (2006).
70. Id. at 81.
71. Id.
72. Sachs, supranote 61, at 1338.
73. As Applegate argues, "[b]y providing a mechanism for regularly revisiting
regulatory decisions, the precautionary principle permits early regulation in the absence
of complete information because it can take another look later." Applegate, supra note 55,
at 77.
74. David Dana, The Contextual Rationalityof the PrecautionaryPrinciple,35 QUEEN'S
L.J. 67, 95 (2009).
75. Id. at 96.
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B. Ethical Viewpoints and Precaution
Perceptions of risk are dependent on a range of factors, including
one's ethical viewpoint. Roger Brownsword has argued that three
dominant ethical viewpoints make up what he refers to as the
"bioethical triangle": 76 the utilitarian view that is concerned with
human welfare; the human rights view that is focused on individual
autonomy; and a third view, which Brownsword calls the "dignitarian
alliance," that is concerned with threats to human dignity] 7 As
Brownsword notes:
The emergence of the new dignitarian view creates a
the
dignitarians
triangular
contest,
genuinely
disagreeing as much with the utilitarians as they do
with the human rights constituency-with the former
because they do not think that consequences, even
entirely "beneficial" consequences (that is, "beneficial"
relative to a utilitarian standard), are determinative;
and with the latter because they do not think that
informed consent cures the compromising of human
78
dignity.
This three-way contest of ethical viewpoints has important
implications for the legitimacy of regulatory responses to risk: for
utilitarians, the precautionary approach will rest on a risk/benefit
analysis; for human rights advocates, precaution may be articulated in
terms of preventing harms to human rights; for the dignitarians,
threats to human dignity are understood as a "red light" not to
proceed.7 9 Indeed, as Brownsword notes, "Iflor dignitarians, the
proposition that we should exercise precaution against the risk that
biotechnology goes wrong misses the point; the point is that, if
biotechnology goes right, human dignity is compromised."80 Of course, it
is important to note that the concept of "dignity" is itself contested, and

76. BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 35; Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, Ethical
Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 22 (Th6r~se Murphy ed., 2009).
77. See Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research
and the "DignitarianAlliance", 17 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15, 16-18
(2003). See also BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 35-41.
78. BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 39.
79. See id. at 108-10.
80. Id. at 110.

EXPANDING HORIZONS

its meaning is subject to considerable scholarly debate.81 The important
message here is that although a precautionary approach is one way of
striking a balance between the benefits and risks of new technologies, a
regulatory approach premised on precaution is unlikely to gain
widespread legitimacy for those who believe that the technology itself is
the harm.8 2 The challenge of diverse, and often deeply-held, community
views about new technologies does require the development of processes
for law reform and the development of regulatory frameworks that can
take account of, and balance, these diverse viewpoints.
C. The Risk of Black Swans
The precautionary principle assumes that there may be scientific
uncertainty over the extent and significance of risk in the context of new
technologies, and that the uncertainty should not itself be a barrier to
regulation. Yet the difficulty in evaluating new technologies is that the
risks are, in many respects, unknowable. Furthermore, while the
precautionary principle may help us to regulate in the face of potential,
but as yet unquantified risks, the precautionary principle may be of
limited value in helping us to anticipate a completely unexpected event
that may arise-whether that is the unforeseen risk that in fact
eventuates, or the entirely new technology or use of technology that
comes along and completely changes the way we do things. In other
words, the precautionary principle may not help us to predict Black
Swan events. As Taleb notes, our tendency to predict the future based
on our experience of the past, while natural for humans, does not help
in anticipating Black Swan events-and it is the Black Swan events
that may arise from new technologies that will be the most significant.
To repeat the quote from Taleb from earlier in this Article "what you
83
don't know [is] far more relevant than what you do know."
Additionally, as Caroline Wraith and Niamh Stephenson have argued,
we are moving from risk management focused on insurance, where risk
is "calculable, probable and of relatively limited scope," to approaches

81. See, e.g., George P. Smith, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulatinga Universal
Right to Health, Health Care, or Health Protection?, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1295,
1312-13 (2005).
82. See BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 130-31; see also ERIK PARENS, JOSEPHINE
JOHNSTON & JACOB MOSES, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE

DEBATES 23-25 (2009).
83. TALEB, supranote 38, at xix.
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that focus on preparedness for "risks which are incalculable and
potentially catastrophic."8 4 These are our Black Swan events.
The argument here should not be taken as suggesting that we throw
out the precautionary principle. Indeed, far from it. The precautionary
principle provides a useful framework for negotiating regulatory
solutions to complex questions of risk in the face of uncertainty. Of
course, if we are to avoid the potentially paralyzing effects of the
precautionary principle identified by Sunstein, we will need to identify
the risks, or perhaps more accurately the kinds of risks, upon which our
precautionary approach is focused, and to prioritize these for our
attention.
But while the precautionary principle is a valuable tool for
negotiating risk, the precautionary principle alone is not sufficient.
Although it works well once a technology has emerged or developed, it
does not help us to develop the sort of flexible regulatory systems that
we need in order to take account of the developments that we do not
foresee-the Black Swan events that, according to Taleb, happen rarely,
have an extreme impact and cannot be predicted in advance.8 5
III. CUTTING EDGE LAWS FOR CUTTING EDGE SCIENCE
What factors are then relevant for the regulatory questions that
arise in relation to new technologies? First, we should not
underestimate the complexity and difficulty of regulating new
technologies. The pace of scientific change, the uncertainty of risk, and
the breadth and diversity of community opinion combine to make the
already complex regulatory task even more complicated. John Applegate
points out that in the context of genetically modified organisms, "two
stories, of astonishing benefits and of fearsome dangers, dominate
perceptions of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and consequently
dominate their regulation."8 6 Debates around risk and new technologies
often range between those who express a positive view of science and
technology and those who have a more cautious view. These views have
been described as "pro-actionary" and "pre-cautionary. 87 As

84. Caroline Wraith & Niamh Stephenson, Risk, Insurance, Preparedness and the
Disappearanceof the Population: The Case of Pandemic Influenza, 18 HEALTH Soc. REV.
220, 225 (2009).
85. See TALEB, supra note 38, at xviii. As Boisson de Chazournes points out, "a
precautionary measure must be anchored to a minimum level of knowledge, a basis of
scientific data presenting a certain consistency." Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 14, at
175.
86. Applegate, supra note 57, at 208.
87. See PARENS, JOHNSTON & MOSES, supra note 82, at 18.
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Brownsword notes, "under conditions of intense uncertainty, with risks
of one kind or another associated with each of the options, and with
divided opinion in the community, the regulatory challenge-the
challenge of knowing when to regulate, and then knowing what to
regulate and how-is daunting."88 Part of this task involves assessing
the adequacy of our existing forms of regulation and deciding the extent
to which the issues raised by a new technology are truly new and
whether new forms of regulation are required.8 9 Kahn has described this
as the "Goldilocks question"-is the current oversight regime "too little,
too much, or just right? Or do we need something different than the
porridge we've been making for the last 30 years?" 90 Of course, as
Marchant and Sylvester point out, many new technologies are already
regulated, to some degree, in existing regulatory frameworks, while
other measures, such as funding decisions for research, support some
areas of research and not others. 91 The question is, do we need to
regulate in this area, at this time?
Second, it is important to acknowledge the relevance of
technological convergence for law and to develop regulatory solutions
that cut across traditional regulatory silos. As the authors of one recent
report on synthetic biology have argued:
As emerging technologies converge, it becomes clearer
that the ethical issues raised by these technologies are
at core similar and familiar. It would be a waste of
resources to take up the ethical questions in parallel;
i.e., it is not profitable to invent a "new kind" of ethics
for each new technology. Instead, we need to get better
at productively engaging the familiar ethical questions
that cut across those emerging-and convergingtechnologies. It is time to go from speaking about
hyphenated ethical enterprises (gen-ethics, nano-ethics,
neuro-ethics, synbio-ethics) to speaking about the ethics
92
of emerging technologies.

88. BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 123; See also BENNETT, supra note 32, at 13-14.

89. See Diana M. Bowman, Governing Nanotechnologies: Weaving New Regulatory
Webs or Patching Up the Old?, 2 NANOETHICS 179 (2008); Christopher J. Preston et al.,
The Novelty of Nano and the Regulatory Challenge of Newness, 4 NANOETHICS 13 (2010).
See also, Bennett, supra note 33.
90. Jeffrey P. Kahn, Commentary: Who's Afraid of the RAC? Lessons from the
Oversight of ControversialScience, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 685, 685 (2009).
91. Marchant and Sylvester, supra note 58, at 714.
92. PARENS, JOHNSTON, & MOSES, supra note 82, at 4. See also Bennett, supra note 33,
at 155-56.
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A similar issue arises in relation to regulatory responses to
convergence as "[i]ssues relating to the development of enabling
technologies straddle jurisdictional and portfolio boundaries." 93 Diana
Bowman and Graeme Hodge have identified the relevance of scientific
convergence for regulation in the context of nanotechnology. 94 They
argue that in order to avoid "regulatory fissures" or gaps, governments
must address the issues relating to nanotechnology across "six
regulatory frontiers": "product safety, privacy and civil liberties,
occupational health and safety (OH&S), intellectual property (IP),
international law and environmental law." 95 Addressing issues of
technological convergence means that we need to look at the similarities
and points of connection between technologies in order to assess the
adequacy of our existing regulatory frameworks.
Third, we need to ensure that legislation is flexible and responsive
to change. It is tempting to assume that a legal solution is a long-term
and perhaps even permanent solution. Yet, in the context of new
technologies, this may not be the case. Technologies change over time,
they develop, they converge with other technologies, and they are put to
uses that we could not have imagined in the early days of the
technology. Fifteen years ago, how many of us could have foreseen the
development of social networking and the way it would transform
personal interaction? How many of us could have foreseen that personal
computers and the Internet would also bring spam, phishing, and
identity theft as new areas of concern? Because of the way that
technologies change over time, it is important to accept that a legal
solution may only be temporary. This means accepting that laws may
need to be subject to regular review, and possibly regular change, in
response to new needs and new knowledge.
In 1970, Justice Windeyer of the High Court of Australia
commented on "1]aw, marching with medicine but in the rear and
limping a little,"96 and the challenges for law are as real now as they
were then. If laws fail to keep pace with scientific change, they can
quickly become irrelevant and fail to achieve the purpose for which they
were introduced. Yet this challenge, of what Brownsword calls
"regulatory connection," brings its own challenges. As Brownsword
notes: "[T]hese features geared for connection and flexibility tend to

93. DEP'T OF INNOVATION, INDUS., SCI. & RES., supra note 54, at 3. See also Bennett,
supra note 33, at 156-57.
94. See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, A Small Matter of Regulation: An
InternationalReuiew of Nanotechnology Regulation, 8 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 11
(2007).
95. Id. 12.
96. Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, 395 (Austl.).
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militate against predictability and consistency. Equally, if connection is
maintained by regular review of legislation, the price to be paid is a
period of regulatory uncertainty which, arguably, serves to chill
97
investment and research initiatives."
Fourth, the contested nature of ethics in contemporary societyillustrated by Brownsword's bioethical triangle-highlights the
challenges associated with finding a common ethical language for
ethically contentious issues. George P. Smith has argued that law can
play an important role as "a third culture" between science and social
commentary, thus endeavouring "to provide a framework for principled
decision-making for complex biotechnological and medical issues in the
21st century."98 Recognizing that law has a role in this area is
important, for as Smith has observed, "every complex moral issue is
more often than not, transformed into a legal issue." 99 In this context,
Smith argues, law becomes the stabilizing force for human affairs. 10 0
Finding a stabilizing role for law is perhaps more important than ever
before for, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, this is "a secular age."' 01
Finally, we must remember that because no country is an island, at
least in terms of trade and technology, we need to continue to explore
opportunities for international dialogue so that we can, as far as
possible, develop harmonized approaches to the challenges posed by new
technologies. Although law tends to be jurisdictionally based, national
borders do not limit science, medicine, and business. The search for
commonality is not an easy task, and the development of a global
consensus has proven difficult, 10 2 although the international human
rights reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 10 3 and,
more recently, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights, 0 4 do represent efforts to articulate universal values. There is
97. Roger Brownsword, Regulating Human Genetics: New Dilemmas for a New
Millennium, 12 MED. L. REV. 14, 31 (2004). See also BENNETT, supranote 32, at 116-17.
98. George P. Smith, Setting Limits: Medical Technology and the Law, 23 SYDNEY L.
REV. 283, 283 (2001). See also BENNETT, supra note 32, at 11-13; Bennett, supra note 33,
at 159.

99. George P. Smith, Law, Religion and Medicine: Conjunctive or Disjunctive?, 2006
MACQUARIE L. SYMP. 9, 16. For discussion of Smith's article see Belinda Bennett, Medical
Science and the Law, 2006 MACQUARIE L. SYMP. 41.
100. See Smith, supra note 99, at 35.
101. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007).
102. See generally GLOBAL BIOETHICS: THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS (H. Tristram
Engelhardt, Jr. ed., 2006). See also BENNETT, supra note 32, at 11-13; Bennett, supra note
33, at 157-58.
103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
104. United Nations Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org., Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights, SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 (2006). For discussion of the Declaration
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value in continuing to search for common ground. 10 5 The increasing
recognition of the relevance of human rights to health and bioethics and
to the development of the law 106 demands that we look beyond our own
borders and engage with the international community in meaningful
ways about the best solutions to common problems facing humanity.
It may be that with all of these challenges, the regulatory task just
seems too difficult. We could adopt a wait and see approach, holding
back on regulation until we know for sure exactly what regulation is
needed. However, "[i]n making our regulatory choices, we are making
choices over the kind of society we want to have and the values that we
hold dear."' 07 Ignoring the issues will not make them go away, and
medical science and technology present challenges of global
significance.108 Within this context, there is an important role for law.
Francis Fukuyama argues that we need to move beyond polarized
debates over biotechnology. As he says:
[w]hile everyone has been busy staking out ethical
positions pro and con various technologies, almost no
one has been looking concretely at what kinds of
institutions would be needed to allow societies to control
the pace and scope of technology development. 10 9
The unknowable nature of Black Swan events means that we need
to move beyond preparing for those events that may be uncertain but
that are, at least to some degree, knowable, and move to models of
regulation that anticipate not only foreseeable risks, but also the
unknown and the unknowable. This means expressly adopting flexible
and holistic approaches to regulation that will enable us to respond to
new technologies and their challenges as they emerge. This is easier
said than done. Even if we were to embrace the precautionary principle,
in either a weak or strong version, we would need to develop approaches
to law that embrace uncertainty and change. At a fundamental level, a
see Michael Kirby, Health Care and Global Justice, 7 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 273 (2011);
Michael Kirby, Human Rights and Bioethics: The Universal Declarationof Human Rights
and UNESCO Universal Declarationof Bioethics and Human Rights, 25 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 309 (2009) [hereinafter Human Rights and Bioethics].
105. See BENNETT, supra note 32, at 118-19.
106. Smith, supra note 81; See Health Care and Global Justice, supra note 104; Human
Rights and Bioethics, supranote 104.
107. BENNETT, supra note 32, at 115.
108. See Michael Kirby, Genomics and Democracy: A Global Challenge, 31 U.W. AUSTL.
L. REV. 1 (2003).
109. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 183 (2002).
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regulatory approach premised on precaution presents challenges to our
traditional understanding of the role of law in the setting of clear limits
and in providing clarity. As Jaye Ellis argues:
[p]recaution seems destined to defeat these attempts
with its fluidity and flexibility, the amorphous nature of
the boundaries that are meant to identify and constrain
the scope of its application, and with its injunction to
keep changing the rules of the game as new knowledge
and understandings are accumulated. 110
Yet such is the nature of new technologies that recognition of the
need for regulatory responses to be flexible and adaptive must be a key
element in planning for the future.
A. A Role for Law Reform Commissions?
The factors outlined above represent formidable challenges for the
development of regulatory responses to new technologies. The
complexity of the science, the pace of change, the diversity of community
viewpoints, the relevance of converging technologies, and the
significance of global developments for regulation at a national level all
give particular importance to the regulatory task. The model of Law
Reform Commissions, used in many common law jurisdictions, provides
a well-established framework for detailed consideration of law reform
and would seem to be well suited to the task of considering "wideranging and controversial legal issues."'
While law reform may arise from the recommendations of
committees or inquiries,1 1 2 formal law reform commissions have been
established in the U.K., Australia,
New Zealand and the Pacific Islands; Canada (federal
and provincial); Hong Kong and South Asia (India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh); the Caribbean
(Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago); and Eastern and
110. Jaye Ellis, Overexploitation of a Valuable Resource? New Literature on the
PrecautionaryPrinciple, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 445, 462 (2006). As Boisson de Chazournes
points out, "a precautionary approach also presumes a flexible and open-ended view of
law." Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 14, at 165.
111. See Ronald Sackville, The Role of Law Reform Agencies in Australia, 59 AUST. L.J.
151, 162 (1985).
112. See Michael Tilbury, A History of Law Reform in Australia, in THE PROMISE OF
LAW REFORM 3, 4 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
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Southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Malawi,
Lesotho, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, [Democratic
11 3
Republic of the Congo], and Zimbabwe).
Modern law reform commissions have been described as permanent,
authoritative, full-time, independent, generalist, interdisciplinary,
consultative, and implementation-minded. 114 Neither the courts nor the
legislature are particularly well positioned to undertake law reform
efforts: the courts, because they must necessarily focus on the issues
related to the individual matter before them, and the legislature,
because of the challenge of fitting law reform activities into busy
legislative agenda. 115 As Michael Tilbury has argued, a core function of
law reform commissions is to provide advice to governments on legal
policy:
Yet, the core function of law reform commissions in
Australia can be identified both historically and from a
present-day perspective: whether a commission is selfreferencing or dependent on receiving its work from a
government, its function in practice is to provide advice
on legal policy. Indeed, the provision of such advice,
which distinguishes law reform bodies from legislatures
(which make law) and courts (which decide disputes), is
implied in the articulated functions of all law reform
commissions. Since commissions cannot themselves
effect alterations in the law, they can only do so by
providing
advice,
especially
through
formal
116
recommendations, on how the law should be reformed.
In the field of science and technological change, law
commissions can play a vital role in consideration of regulatory
and in community engagement with those options. Law
commissions in Australia and New Zealand have reported on

reform
options
reform
a wide

113. David Weisbrot, The Future of Institutional Law Reform, in THE PROMISE OF LAW
REFORM 18, 18 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005). See also Michael Kirby, Law
Reform, Human Rights and Modern Governance: Australia's Debt to Lord Scarman, 80
AUST. L.J. 299, 307 (2006).
114. Weisbrot, supra note 113, at 22-35.
115. Michael Tilbury, Why Law Reform Commissions? A Deconstruction and
Stakeholder Analysis from an AustralianPerspective, 23 WINDSOR Y.B. AcCESS JUST. 313,
321-22 (2005). For discussion of law reform and the role of the courts see Sir Anthony
Mason, Law Reform and the Courts, in THE PROMISE OF LAw REFORM 314 (Brian Opeskin
& David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
116. See Tilbury, supra note 115, at 324.
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range of issues relevant to new technologies in medical science
including: human tissue transplants, 117 genetic privacy, 118 gene
patents, 119 reproductive technologies, 120 surrogacy, 121 and legal
parentage of children conceived through assisted reproductive
technologies or surrogacy. 122 The principle of community consultation
has been a defining feature of the work of law reform commissions in
Australia. Indeed, as Michael Kirby, the first Chairman of the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has noted:
[p]robably the most original "value added" of the
ALRC-and its chief contribution to the law reform
technique in the years after its establishment-was its
23
emphasis on public consultation. 1
The independent nature of the commissions and their consultative
approach to policy development allows for community engagement,
consultation, and debate. For example, for their landmark 2003 report
on genetic privacy, 124 the ALRC and the Australian Health Ethics
Committee (AHEC) undertook widespread consultation involving public
hearings and submissions from community, commercial, and
professional groups, as well as consultation with international
agencies, 125 ultimately producing "an independent, evidence-based and
dispassionate set of recommendations to carry Australia forward."' 126
By engaging the community in discussions about the formulation of
legal policy, law reform commissions "can play- an important role in

117. See generally AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, HUMAN TISSUE TRANSPLANTS (1977).
118. See generally AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N & AUSTL. HEALTH ETHICS COMM., supra

note 22.
119. See generally AuSTL. LAW REFORM
PATENTING AND HUMAN HEALTH (2004).

COMM'N,

120. See generally NEW SOUTH WALES LAW

GENES AND INGENUITY:

REFORM

COMMISSION,

GENE

ARTIFICIAL

CONCEPTION: HUMAN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (1986); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION: IN VITRO FERTILISATION (1988); VICTORIAN LAW
REFORM COMMISSION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND ADOPTION (2007).
121. See generally NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION:
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988).
122. See generally N.Z. LAW COMM'N, NEW ISSUES IN LEGAL PARENTAGE (2005).

123. Michael Kirby, Are We There Yet?, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM 433, 435 (Brian
Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
124. See generally AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N & AUSTL. HEALTH ETHICS COMM., supra

note 22.
125. Don Chalmers, Science, Medicine and Health and the Work of the Australian Law
Reform Commission, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM 374, 380-81 (Brian Opeskin &
David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
126. Id. at 386.
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building public trust."127 As Marcia Neave has argued, "public
participation in the law reform process is a form of civic conversation,
which can reinforce community trust in the rule of law and in legal
institutions." 12S Importantly, law reform commissions can also share
information and expertise with other law reform commissions, 129 a
valuable feature in an increasingly globalized world.
In their 2003 report on genetic information, the ALRC and AHEC
identified "seven attributes of the reform process" to ensure that legal
reform would be relevant to future scientific developments. These
attributes required that:
[G]overnments and other public institutions should:
*

Promote widespread community participation in
the formulation of relevant rules and principles;

*

Find appropriate balances between competing
interests;

*

Adopt processes that facilitate
from all relevant disciplines;

*

Consider the cross-border implications of the
issues, whether they be federal or international
in character;

*

Consider forms of regulation that are flexible
and quick to adapt to changing circumstances;

"

Seek simple and effective regulation through
greater harmonisation of the regulatory regimes
in different jurisdictions; and

*

Establish and maintain such institutions as are
appropriate to address, on an on-going basis,

contributions

127. Marcia Neave, InstitutionalLaw Reform in Australia: The Past and the Future, 23
WINDSOR Y.B. AcCESS JUST. 343, 365 (2005).
128. Marcia Neave, Law Reform and Social Justice, in THE PROMISE OF LAW REFORM
358, 366 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
129. See Michael Sayers, Co-operation Across Frontiers, in THE PROMISE OF LAW
REFORM 243 (Brian Opeskin & David Weisbrot eds., 2005).
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issues relating to the use and protection of
1 30
human genetic information.
By reviewing our laws with these attributes in mind, we can ensure
that our regulatory frameworks engage public trust and have the
necessary flexibility to respond to new technologies.
CONCLUSION
We are all traveling together on a journey to the future. Since ours
is a highly technological age, it is clear that our journey will, in many
ways, be a technological one. Some of those technologies and uses of the
technologies will be foreseeable, at least to some degree. But, as we
travel along this journey, we may see some Black Swans along the
way-completely new technologies may develop, or existing technologies
may develop in surprising new ways. Law has an important role to play
on the scientific frontier, and we must consider how best to craft our
laws so they provide appropriate support for our journey to the future.

130. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N & Ausm. HEALTH ETHICS COMM., supra note 22, at
155. See also BENNETT, supra note 32, at 116-18.

